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NOTES
The Legal Status of Treasury Shares
Treasury shares are defined by a California statute as those shares which
have been issued and thereafter acquired by the same corporation, "but not re-
tired or restored to the status of unissued shares".' A Missouri court has de-
scribed them as shares of its own stock "belonging to and subject to sale by a
corporation". 2  Both of these definitions attempt to describe the same
phenomenon, namely, reacquired shares which the corporation does not intend
to cancel or retire, but both definitions involve legal aspects of treasury shares
upon which the law, statutory and judicial, is far from clear. In what respects
are such shares "not restored to the status of unissued shares"? And in what
sense do they "belong", as property, to the corporation? The present law pro-
vides no adequate answer to either of these questions, but it does indicate that
they cannot be answered simply or categorically.
Strictly, a corporation cannot become its own shareholder.3 It obviously
cannot have a proprietary interest in itself.4 It may not vote its treasury
shares 5 and, according to statutes in eight states, may not receive dividends
upon them.6  Three state statutes make treasury shares non-assessable.7  The
right to inspect the books of the corporation has, of course, no significance in
the case of treasury shares. It thus appears that, at least in some jurisdictions,
no incidents of shareholdership are enjoyed by a corporation as holder of its
own stock, and in all jurisdictions most of the incidents are lacking.
In this and in some other respects, treasury shares are analogous to un-
issued or cancelled shares. Eight state statutes expressly provide that they are
i. C.. Civ. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1932) § 278.
2. Maynard v. Doe Run Lead Co., 305 Mo. 356, 370, 265 S. W. 94, 97 (924).
3. I MoRAwETz, PRIVATE CORPO ATIONS (2d ed. x886) 114.
4. Thus an accounting must be made on the basis of the remaining shares outside of the
treasury. Gustin v. Merrill, i44 Mich. 498, io8 N. W. 408 (i9o6).
5. Apuc. DIG. STAT. (Castle, Supp. i93i) § i7oig; CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933)
§ 342b; I COLO. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) § 996; CONN. GEN. STAT. (930) C.
,91, § 3423; DEL-. GEN. Com. L. § I9; 3 FLA. COMP. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1928) § 6534;
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 29, § 356 (i4); IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 4902; ME.
REV. STAT. (1930) C. 56, § 46; 1 MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 22; 2 MICE. CoM.
LAws (1929) § 9984, amended by Mich. Laws 1931, no. 194, P. 313; 3 MINN. STAT. (Mason,
SuPP. 1936) § 7492-25; i Mo. REv. STAT. (x929) § 4940; 3 MONT. REv. CODE § 5986; i NEV.
Coup. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 16o8, amended by Nev. Laws 1931, c. 224, § 6; 2 N. J. Coup.
STAT. (Supp. 1925-1930) § 47-38; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 32-144; N. C.
CODE (Michie, 1935) § 1174; N. D. Coup. LAws (1913) § 4583; OHIo CODE ANN. (Throck-
morton's Baldwin, 1934) § 8623-52; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit I5, § 2852-508;
TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 3722 (9) ; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (i933) tit. 18, C. 2,
§ 43; VA CODE ANN. (1930) § 3802; 5 WASH. RaV. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1934) § 3803-28;
W. VA. CODE (1932) c. 31, art. I, § 3051; see Hills, Model Corporation Act (935) 48 HA v.
L. REv. 1334, 1373. See Walsh v. State, I99 Ala. 123, 131, 74 So. 45, 49 (1917).
6. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 342b; 2 IDAHO CODE ANN. (932) tit. 29,
§ 156 (13); 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. I56, §20 (shares forfeited for unpaid install-
ments) ; 3 MONT. Rv. CODE § 5985; N. D. Coup. LAws (913) § 4582; 2 S. D. CoMp. LAWS
(1929) §8807; UTAH RaV. STAT. ANN. (1933) tit. I8, c. 4, § i8; W. VA. CODE ANN. (1932)
c. 31, art. I, § 3050; see Hills, Model Corporation Act (I935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1373.
One case, however, upheld a dividend declared upon treasury shares to be applied to the pur-
chase price of the shares for the benefit of certain shareholders. Hartley v. Pioneer Iron
Works, I8I N. Y. 73, 73 N. E. 576 (905).
7. IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 29, § i56 (13) ; MONT. REv. CODE § 5985; N. D. Coup.




not to be considered outstanding for purposes of determining either a quorum
or a majority of the voting shares,$ and it is to be inferred that the same is true
in jurisdictions which forbid them to be voted, since such a prohibition would
otherwise have little effect. Treasury shares, like unissued shares, must be
registered under the Federal Securities Act of 1933 before they may be sold.'
But for most purposes treasury shares are distinguished from unissued shares
or treated as still outstanding.
0
This distinction is particularly important in cases involving the so-called
pre-emptive right of shareholders to subscribe for new shares in proportion to
their present holdings."1 Such a right is given to stockholders as a protection
against dilution of their proprietary interest in the corporation and reduction
of their proportionate voting strength, and is generally accorded with regard to
unissued shares.1 2 It has been held not to apply to the reissue of treasury
shares 1 3 except (i) where there has been a breach of fiduciary duty on the
part of the directors or officers in reissuing the shares, 14 or (2) where the cor-
poration has acquired the shares with an intent to hold them indefinitely or to
retire them. 9  The basis for this distinction is apparently that the original issue
of shares has already diluted both the proprietary interest and the voting strength
of the shares remaining in the hands of the shareholders, and the subsequent re-
issue merely restores all shares to the status they enjoyed before the treasury
shares were acquired by the corporation.1
6
Similarly, other restrictions imposed by charter 1 7 or by law "I upon the crea-
tion of new shares have been held inapplicable to the reissue of treasury shares.
Most important of these is the rule that subscribers remain liable to creditors to
the extent that they have not paid the full par value of their shares. If treasury
shares have been fully paid before reacquisition, they may be reissued as fully paid
8. Aax. DIG. STAT. (Castle, Supp. 1931) § 1701g; FLA. Comp'. LAws ANN. (Skillman,
1928) § 6534; 3 MONT. REv. CODE § 5986; 1 NEv. Comp. LAWs (Hillyer, 1929) § I6o8,
amended by Nev. Laws 1936, c. 224, p. 42o; 2 N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1925-1930) § 47-38;
N. D. Cou'. LAws (1913) § 4583; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 15, § 2852-
508; 5 WAsH. REv. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1934) § 3803-28.
9. Fed. Trade Comm. Release, No. 131, March 13, 1934.
io. In the Illinois Business Incorporation Act treasury shares described as "... 'is-
sued' shares, but not 'outstanding' shares." ILL. R v. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 32, 2 ().
ii. See RESTATMENT, BusINEss AssocATIoxs (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1928) § 17; Frey,
Shareholders Pre-emptive Rights (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 563, 58o; Drinker, The Pre-emptive
Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares (1930) 43 HAv. L. REv. 586, 603.
12. In one jurisdiction the right is not granted with respect to authorized but unissued
shares unless the newly issued shares represent an expansion of the business beyond the
limits originally contemplated. This holding is probably due to a fear that early subscribers
to an issue of shares will demand pre-emptive rights to all the shares issued after theirs.
The distinction made, however, would seem to be a tenuous one. Archer v. Hesse, 164 App.
Div. 493, 15o N. Y. Supp. 296 (ist Dep't, 1914), as limited by Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage
& Repair Co., 253 N. Y. 274, 17o N. E. 917 (1930). Contra: Titus v. Paul State Bank, 32
Idaho 23, 179 Pac. 514 (1919) and cases cited therein.
13. Borg v. International Silver Co., Ii F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Crosby v.
Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212, 68 Pac. 130 (19o2); Hartridge v. Rockwell, R. M. Charlton 26o
(Ga. 1828) ; State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266 (1876); cf. Maynard v. Doe Run Lead Co., 305 Mo.
356, 265 S. W. 94 (1924) ; Wildes v. Rural Homestead Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 452, 32 Atl. 676
(1896). Three state statutes have adopted this rule: I LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932)
§ xO8; 5 MIcE. Comp. LAws (Mason, Supp. 1933) § 10135-3,; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throck-
morton's Baldwin, 1934) § 8623-35.
14. Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 8o N. E. 450 (1907) ; Hammer v. Werner, 239 App.
Div. 38, 265 N. Y. Supp. 172 (2d Dep't, 1933).
15. Dunn v. Acme Auto & Garage Co., 168 Wis. 128, 169 N. W. 297 (1918).
16. See Borg v. International Silver Co., ii F. (2d) 147, IWI (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
17. City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce and Fox, 17 N. Y. 511 (858).
x8. Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Co., 45 Colo. 81, ioo Pac. 596 (19o9).
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for the best price obtainable.19 This is not true, however, if the shares were not
originally fully paid,20 unless the purchaser can demonstrate that he bought in
good faith and without notice of the fact that they were unpaid.21 A better method
of approach to this problem would be to take into consideration whether or not the
shares were repurchased by the corporation and, if so, at what price. Since the
purpose of the original restriction is to guarantee the receipt by the corporation of
assets of a value corresponding to the amount of stated capital represented by the
shares, the amount paid out for repurchase should certainly be as relevant a factor
as the amount received upon reissue. Where the corporation reacquires shares not
fully paid, the remaining shareholders are not liable for the unpaid portion,22 nor
is the liability of holders of assessable bank stock increased by the reacquisition of
some of the assessable shares by the bank.
2 3
In one jurisdiction treasury stock has been treated as outstanding for pur-
poses of computing corporate franchise taxes.2 4 It is "issued" stock in the sense
that the capital stock of the corporation (more accurately described by modem
statutes as "stated capital") is not reduced by its acquisition 25 and need not be
increased upon its resale. Most corporation statutes prescribe certain definite
procedures for the reduction of "stated capital" or "capital stock", and something
more than the mere reacquisition of shares is generally required. Thus, although
the corporation does not become a shareholder of its treasury shares in any ordi-
nary sense, it is not permissible in most cases to consider such shares as analogous
to authorized but unissued shares.
Whether treasury shares are to be treated as assets of the corporation or not,
is a more perplexing problem. For many years courts have rather loosely spoken
of them as "assets" 26 or "property", 7 frequently in cases where the property as-
pects of the shares were not even involved. On the other hand, a much quoted
dictum of Judge Hand in the Borg case expresses a quite contrary view,29 and the
recently promulgated "Model Corporation Act" 29 provided that treasury shares
should not be considered as assets "for any purpose". The cases in which this
question is involved give various answers to it, but there seems to be a tendency
toward the asset conception for many purposes. Thus treasury shares have been
taxed as personal property30 although it is questionable whether they may be
I9. Pullman v. Railway Equipment Co., 73 II1. App. 313 (,897) ; Ewing v. Swenson, 167
Minn. 113, 208 N. W. 645 (1926). So also where the shares are held in trust for the corpora-
tion: Davis Bros. v. Montgomery Furnace & Chemical Co., ioi Ala. 127, 8 So. 496 (i8go).
2o. Enright v. Heckscher, 240 Fed. 863 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Alling v. Ward, I33 Ill.
264, 24 N. E. 55 (89o) ; Campbell v. McPhee, 36 Wash. 593, 79 Pac. 206 (19o).
21. Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash. 292, 116 Pac. 833 (1911).
22. Crawford v. Roney, 126 Ga. 163, 55 S. E. 499 (19o6).
23. Crease v. Babcock, Io Metc. 525 (Mass. 1846).
24. Knickerbocker Importation Co. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 74 N. J. L. 583, 65 Atl.
913 (1907) ; Goldstein-Fineberg Co. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 83 N. J. L. 61, 83 Atl. 773
(19m).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 342a; Porter v. Plymouth Gold Min. Co.,
29 Mont. 347, 74 Pac. 938 (1904) ; see Hartridge v. Rockwell, R. M. Charlton 26o, 262 (Ga.
1828) ; Knickerbocker Importation Co. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 74 N. J. L. 583, 589,,65
Atl. 913, 9,5 (1907).
26. See Crosby v. Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212, 221, 68 Pac. 130, 233 (1902) ; Porter v.
Plymouth Gold Min. Co., 29 Mont. 347, 355, 74 Pac. 938, 94o (19o4).
27. See Hartridge v. Rockwell, R. M. Charlton 260, 262 (Ga. 1828).
28. "They are not a present asset, because, as they stand, the defendant cannot collect
upon them. What in fact they are is an opportunity to acquire new assets for the corporate
treasury by creating new obligations." Borg v. International Silver Co., II F. (2d) 147, 15o
(C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
29. Hills, Model Corporation Act (1935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 1334, 1373.
3o. Richmond & Danville R. R. v. Comm'rs of Alamance, 84 N. C. 504 (I881); cf.
Worcester v. Board of Appeal, 184 Mass. 46o, 69 N. E. 330 (1904).
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levied upon by creditors. 1 They may be pledged as security for a loan, just as
other securities of the corporation may be pledged.3 2 Whether in such a situation
the shares lose their character as treasury shares and carry with them the normal
incidents of pledged shares seems to be unsettled.38  There does not appear to be
any reason for denying these incidents, provided that the transaction is in good
faith and is not used as a device for the evasion of restrictions.
34
The ambiguous nature of treasury shares has caused considerable difficulty
to the Federal Treasury Department in income tax cases. For many years the
Treasury Regulations stated, apparently upon the theory that treasury shares are
not true assets,35 that "a corporation realizes no gain or loss from the purchase or
sale of its own stock".38 Despite the apparent clarity of this expression, the Board
of Tax Appeals and the federal courts have allowed losses incurred in an ex-
change of corporate assets for previously issued shares to be treated as losses for
income tax purposes,3 7 and in one case the acquisition of shares in satisfaction of
a judgment was treated as a gain.38 The most recent regulation on the subject
accordingly provides that the decision in each case must depend upon "the real
nature of the transaction". If it appears that the corporation has dealt with the
stock as it would have dealt with the stock of another corporation, a gain or loss
is to be indicated. "So also if the corporation receives its own stock as considera-
tion upon the sale of property by it, or in satisfaction of indebtedness due to
it. . . ." "I This recognition of the possibility that treasury shares may or may
not be assets according to the treatment accorded them is certainly a more realistic
approach to the problem. In this connection it is interesting to note that for pur-
poses of the Pennsylvania Stock Transfer Tax,40 the purchase of shares is con-
sidered by the Department of Revenue as taxable only if the shares are to be held
as treasury shares. If they are purchased for cancellation, there is no "transfer
of title",41 and the transaction is therefore not taxable.
42
Another situation in which the asset character of treasury shares is of consid-
erable importance arises in stock dividend cases. If they are assets, then
31. This situation rarely arises. In Robinson v. Spaulding Gold & Silver Min. Co., 72
Cal. 32, 13 Pac. 65 (887), it was held that the corporation had no interest in its treasury
shares which could be attached by creditors, but in Coit v. Freed, 15 Utah 426, 49 Pac. 533
(897), an attachment and execution sale of such shares was upheld.
32. Kinsman v. Fisk, 83 Hun. 494, 31 N. Y. Supp. 1045 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
33. Brewster v. Hartley, 37 Cal. 15 (1869) ; Thomas v. International Silver Co., 72 N. J.
Eq. 224, 73 Atl. 833 (1907) (pledged treasury shares may not be voted). Contra: Vail v.
Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453 (1881) ; cf. Granite Brick Co. v. Titus, 226 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 4th,
1915) in which unissued shares pledged by a corporation were permitted to be voted in ac-
cordance with the pledge agreement. Ordinarily a pledgee of stock is entitled to receive
dividends, but only for the purpose of applying them to the debt: Note (193o) 67 A. L. R.
485. There would seem to be no reason for the corporate pledgor of treasury shares to label
its payments on the debt dividends.
34. Thomas v. International Silver Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 224, 73 Atl. 833 (1907), where
directors attempted to vote treasury shares indirectly by placing them in the hands of a
pledgee.
35. See Houston Bros. Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 21 B. T. A. 804, 8,5 (1930).
36. U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 542, 563; id. 62, Art. 542, 563; id. 65, Art. 543, 563; id. 69,
Art. 443, 563; id. 74, Art. 66, 176; Simmons & Hammond Mfg. Co., i B. T. A. 803 (1925) ;
Cooperative Furniture Co., 2 B. T. A. 165 (1925).; Houston Bros. Co. v. Commissioner of
Int. Rev., 21 B. T. A. 804 (1930).
37. Spear & Co. v. Heiner, 54 F. (2d) 134 (W. D. Pa. 1934); Behlow Estate Co. v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 12 B. T. A. 1365 (1928) ; New Jersey Porcelain Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Int. Rev., I5 B. T. A. 1059 (1929).
38. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Woods Mach. Co., 52 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. xst, 1932).
39. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 22 (a), 16.
40. PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 2041.
41. DeWitt's Case, 49 Pa. C. C. Rep. 364 (Op. Att'y Gen. 1919).
42. Prentice-Hall St. & Loc. Tax Serv. (Penn.) 1136, 210.
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a dividend in the form of treasury shares is not a true stock dividend, for
the latter does not reduce the assets of the corporation 43 and does affect
the proportionate value of the individual shares upon which it is declared.44 And
the courts have so held in a variety of situations.45 In those jurisdictions in which
stock dividends are awarded to the corpus of a trust estate, dividends in treasury
shares have been held allocable to income on the ground that they were in the
nature of "cash" dividends.46 However, if it appears that the distribution is not
truly one of earnings, the stock will be awarded to the corpus.4 7  Although there
are no decided cases, there is some indication that treasury share dividends do not
enjoy the same immunity from income taxation that is accorded to certain stock
dividends. 48 In an office decision of recent years the Treasury Department ex-
pressed the opinion that such dividends are not taxable.4" However, the new Fed-
eral Revenue Act in the section which provides for "dividend credits" for taxable
dividends, allows such a credit for dividends paid "in property other than money
(including stock of the corporation if held by the corporation as an invest-
ment) .... ), 50 This provision is expanded in a recent Treasury Regulation as
follows: "As used in this article, the term 'property' includes shares of the capital
stock of the corporation making the dividend distribution, if such shares are held
by it as an investment. Unless shown to the contrary, shares of capital stock once
issued but thereafter acquired by the corporation in any manner whatsoever, but
not retired, shall be deemed to be held by the corporation as an investment." 51
Here again is an indication that the asset character of treasury stock may depend
in each case upon its use by the corporation.
It is undoubtedly true that under certain circumstances treasury shares are
properly described as assets. They are frequently purchased for the purpose of
subsequent resale at a profit. In many cases they can be readily converted into
cash, and they often have an ascertainable market value. But it must be noted
that they do not have a liquidating value. For this reason they are not assets in
the very important sense of providing a margin of protection to creditors of the
corporation. Their value would completely disappear at the very time when most
needed by creditors, i. e., upon insolvency. Therefore, it seems obvious that, in
determining whether a given corporate act is in violation of creditors' rights, it
would be improper to consider treasury shares as assets. This question has been
rarely litigated and almost completely ignored in the statutes. Despite the many
limitations placed upon dividend distributions for the protection of creditors, only
four statutes specifically forbid the use of treasury shares as assets in computing
43. See Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547, 552, 65 Atl. 1O56, 1057 (,907).
44. See Leland v. Hayden, lO2 Mass. 542, 551 (i869).
45. Commonwealth v. Boston & A. R. Co., 14- Mass. 146, 7 N. E. 716 (1886) (statute
forbidding stock dividends not applicable to treasury shares) ; Dock v. Schlichter Jute Cordage
Co., 167 Pa. 370, 31 Atl. 656 (1895) (While the court intimates that stock dividends may be
revoked before certificates are issued this is held not to be true of treasury shares) ; see Joyce
v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 244, 195 Pac. 29, 30 (1921).
46. Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547, 65 Atl. 1o56; Leland v. Hayden, io2 Mass. 542
(1869).
47. Matter of Affleck, 83 Misc. 659, 146 N. Y. Supp. 835 (Surr. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 214
N. Y. 662, io8 N. E. io88 (I915) ; Matter of James' Estate, 140 Misc. 369, 25o N. Y. Supp.
5o6 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; Pabst v. Goodridge, 133 Wis. 43, 113 N. W. 398 (I9O7) (treasury
shares held to have been part of the principal assets of the corporation).
48. See dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 228
(192o). See also Legis. (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 83, io5; Winsor, The Possibility of
Taxing Dividends Paid in Treasury Stock (I92I) 2 NAT. INcom TAX MAG. 328.
49. I. T. 2449, VIII-i Cum. BULL. ioi (1929).
50. 49 STAT. 1665, 26 U. S. C. A. § 27 (c) (Supp. 1936). For the view that such divi-
dends should be taxable under the Act, see Legis. (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 83, 105.
5I. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 27 (c), I.
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the fund available for dividends.5 2 In eight jurisdictions a corporation may pur-
chase its own stock only when its capital will not be impaired thereby,53 and in
an equal number such shares may be purchased only out of surplus. 4 If treasury
shares are to be carried as assets, these statutory provisions can be completely
nullified. By merely restricting each purchase to the amount of the surplus and
then by using the acquired shares to indicate a continuation of the same surplus, a
corporation could continue to purchase its own shares indefinitely and thus "bail
out" all of the shareholders at the expense of creditors.55 It is, of course, highly
improbable that the courts will allow this,56 and yet in one case it was held that a
statutory prohibition against impairment of capital did not mean that shares could
be purchased only out of surplus, thus necessarily implying that the reacquired
shares took the place of the consideration paid for them as corporate assets.5 7 It
is impossible to ascertain to what extent treasury shares have actually been used
to evade these restrictions, but it may be significant that a recent study of eighty
large corporations revealed that twenty-five of them carried treasury shares on
their books as assets.55
In accounting practice reacquired shares have enjoyed a status no less am-
biguous than in law. Upon corporate balance sheets they have appeared as cur-
rent assets, investment assets, unclassified assets, deductions from earned surplus,
from stated capital, from aggregate net worth, and from various combinations of
individual elements of net worth. They have been variously valued at cost of
acquisition, original price issued for, par or stated value, market value, and a frac-
tional portion of capital stock value.55 The earliest method of dealing with them
was to represent them as assets, 5 which, as we have seen, may give a false im-
pression of the legal fund available for dividends and purchase of shares."' A
newer method, to list them as a deduction from capital stock, 6- is also liable to
misrepresent the true situation, unless it is somehow indicated that the legal or
52. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 342b; Ill. Laws, 3d Spec. Sess. 1934, p. 147,
82 (m) ; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 7492-21; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) c. 248, § 53,
amended by R. I. Acts and Resolves 1932, c. 1941, § 53.
53. CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) c. 34, § 996; DEL. REv. CODE (1915) c.
65, § ig; Ix. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 49o2 (8) ; Micr. Comit. LAWs (Mason, Supp.
1933) § 10135-10 (h); I Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §4940 (12); NEv. Coup. LAWs (Hillyer,
Supp. 1934) § x6o8; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) c. 248, § 5 (g); W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 31, art.
I, § 3051.
54. Ark. Acts 1931, Act 255, § 7 (e); 3 FLA. Coup. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1928)
§ 6534 (3); MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. 23, § 5o (7); OHao CODE ANN.
(Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934) § 8623-41; 2 OKLA. STAT. (931) § 9747; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1934) tit. 15, § 2852-302(7) ; S. D. CoMP. LAws (1929) § 8777; TENN. CODE
(Michie, 1932) § 3722 (g).
55. See Lewis, Some Legal and Accounting Questions Presented by the Michigan Gen-
eral Corporation Act (1933) 8 ACCOUNTING REv. 145; GRAHMI AND KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN
LAW PRACTICE (1932) 156.
56. Robinson v. Wangermann, 75 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) (treasury shares are
not assets to take the place of the money used to purchase them) ; see Blackstock, A Corpora-
tion's Power to Purchase its Own Stock and Some Related Problems (1935) 13 TEx. L.
REV. 442, 455.
57. Colorado Indust. Loan & Inv. Co. v. Clem, 82 Colo. 399, 260 Pac. O19 (1927).
58. Holt and Morris, Some Aspects of Reacquired Stock (1934) 12 HARv. Bus. REv.
505, 508.
59. Bowles, Treasury Shares on the Balance Sheet (1934) 58 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 98.
6o. Fed. Securities & Exch. Comm., Instruction Book, Form A-2, for Corporations, I
Prentice-Hall Fed. Securities Reg. Serv. 5440.19: "If reacquired stock (treasury stock) is
shown as an asset in the balance sheet, give the reasons therefor and state the number of
shares and the amount at which carried."
61. Marple, Treasury Stock (1934) 57 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 257, 261, 262.
62. Wakefield, When Lawyers and Accountants Disagree (1934) 58 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY
117, 118.
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"stated" capital (which is not a fund, but a legal requirement) has not been re-
duced. 63 Therefore, a third method has been advocated, involving a deduction
from earned surplus,6 or combined capital and surplus 6 5 and a valuation at cost
of acquisition. The question as to which method is to be preferred is largely one
of accounting theory and therefore not within the scope of this Note.66  But what-
ever method is used, it is important that the situation with regard to legal restric-
tions for the benefit of creditors should be clearly shown, so that both creditors
and corporate officers may act accordingly. 7 Furthermore, accountants should be
particularly careful to use methods which will not tend to mislead the lay public
as to the true financial state of the corporation.
In recent years the acquisition and holding of treasury shares has become in-
creasingly prevalent. 68 They have been used not only as a source of ready cash,
but also to some extent to affect the trends of stock prices. This practice, although
of considerable value as a steadying influence in time of panic, may often become
a source of abuse by insiders at the expense of stockholders and the public gen-
erally.65 It is regrettable that, despite the increasingly important function of treas-
ury shares, their status has been so inadequately defined by courts and legislatures.
Seven states have no provision whatever in their corporation statutes with re-
gard to them 7 0 and in over half of the states the statutes on the subject are strik-
ingly incomplete. Although it is difficult to reach a definite conclusion or set of
conclusions as to the legal role of treasury shares, it certainly seems evident that
they are sui generis. They may not, as has been pointed out, be accurately de-
scribed as unissued shares, issued shares, cancelled shares, outstanding shares,
assets, or non-assets. In view of the peculiar nature of such shares, their various
attributes should receive careful consideration in each case. Attempts to force
them into rigid categories merely because of strong analogies in particular situa-
tions will result only in increasing confusion both as to legal policies and the
rationale thereof.
J.A.S.
The Acceleration of Contingent Remainders 1
Introduction
The doctrine of acceleration is a legal device whereby the time of the vesting
in possession of a future interest is hastened by virtue of the failure for some
reason or other 2 of the preceding estate. Inasmuch as it has been settled from
time immemorial that a contingent remainder, prior to taking effect in possession,
63. Marple, supra note 59, at 262; Hatfield, Accounting Principles and the Statutes
(934) 58 J. OF AccouNTANcy 90, 94.
64. Bowles, supra note 57, at 104.
65. Correspondence (1934) 58 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 314.
66. Fed. Securities & Exch. Comm., Instruction Book, Form A-2, for Corporations, i
Prentice-Hall Fed. Securities Reg. Serv. 1 5440.22: "Reacquired stock (treasury stock) is
preferably to be shown as a deduction from capital stock or from either the total of capital
stock and surplus, or from surplus, at either par or cost as the circumstances require."
67. For further discussion of this problem, see Hills, Stated Capital and Treasury Shares
(1934) 57 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 202.
68. Holt and Morris, supra note 56.
69. BERLE AND MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) 175.
70. Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin.
I. See Simes, The Acceleration of Future Interests (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 659, 666-670.
2. Factors which raise the problem of acceleration are renunciation, forfeiture, inca-
pacity to take, election to take against the will, remarriage, etc.
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must be supported or preceded by a prior estate of freehold,3 it would seem
strange that any such doctrine should find support in law. Yet courts soon
evolved this doctrine in order better to carry out the intention of testators,
grantors, and settlors.4
Although there is some division of authority, the great majority of jurisdic-
tions will accelerate vested remainders, there being no express intent to the con-
trary,5 generally on the theory that the holder of such an interest always stands
ready to take, and that the phrase "at the death of the life tenant" means whenso-
ever and howsoever the life estate terminates.6 However, in view of the age-old
principle that a contingent remainder is destroyed by the termination of the par-
ticular estate prior to the removal of the contingency,7 no such unanimity of
opinion exists with regard to the acceleration of such interests. Cases, turning as
they do on the question of intention, vary greatly in theory and result.
I. Study of Cases Where Contingent Remainders Were Not Accelerated
The majority of cases in this category rely upon the theory that at the time
of the premature termination of the life estate it is impossible to accelerate the
remainder because at that time the exact objects of the testator's bounty are as
yet unknown. Such a theory may be termed the "common law theory", for it
most nearly approaches the strict common law view that if the contingencies are
not removed prior to the termination of the particular estate, the remainder is
destroyed. Thus, in Brandenburg v. Thorndike,8 there was a devise to trustees
upon trust to pay an annual income to the testator's wife for life, and three years
after her death, or earlier or later at the discretion of the trustees, to testator's
nieces and nephews then surviving or to the issue of any deceased niece or
nephew. A bill for the termination of the trust and a transfer of the property at
the time of the renunciation of the wife to the then living nieces and nephews
was dismissed, on the ground that there could be no acceleration of the interests
of the nieces and nephews because at the time of the renunciation it was impos-
sible to determine who would survive the wife. While this result is logically
sound, an equally possible construction of the testator's intent is that he desired
first to provide for his wife and then for the relatives mentioned. Inasmuch as
the wife, by taking against the will, was provided for, it would seem that the
nieces and nephews should then be allowed to take. Such a result, however, is
impossible under the "common law theory".
Much the same theory was employed by the supreme court of Mississippi in
Rose v. Rose." In that case there was a devise to testator's wife for life, and upon
her death, to such of her children begotten by the testator as shall then be living.
3. I BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES (Chitty, Archbold, Christian, 1827) 121; COKE,
LITTLErON (Coventry, 183o) § 6o.
4. Crossan v. Crossan, 303 Mo. 572, 579, 262 S. W. 701, 702 (1924). See also 2
SHFPPARD, ToucHSTONE (8th ed. 1826) 435 n. k.
5. Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 Ill. 6o6, 94 N. E. g8o (1911) ; Parker v. Ross,
69 N. H. 213, 45 AtI. 576 (1897) ; Davidson v. Miners & Mechanics Trust Co., 129 Ohio
St. 418, 195 N. E. 845 (1935); Trustees of Kenyon College v. Cleveland Trust Co., 13o
Ohio St. 1O7, 196 N. E. 784 (1935), 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 115; Jull v. Jacobs, (1876) 3 Ch.
Div. 703. Contra: Cassidy v. Padgett, 99 Ind. App. 239, 19o N. E. 133 (1934). See also
In re Rawling's Estate, 81 Ia. 701, 47 N. W. 992 (1891) ; Cotton v. Fletcher, 77 N. H. 216,
go AtL. 510 (1914) ; Holdren v. Holdren, 78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N. E. 845 (1908) ; Key v.
Weathersbee, 43 S. C. 414, 21 S. E. 324 (1894).
6. KALES, ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 192o) § 599; 2 JARMAN, WILLS
(7th ed. 1930) 700, 701.
7. Archer's Case, I Co. Rep. 66b (Q. B. 1599) ; I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, loc. Cit.
supra note 4.
8. 139 Mass. 102, 28 N. E. 575 (I885).
9. r26 Miss. 114, 88 So. 513 (921).
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The widow renounced and contracted to purchase the interest of the children in
the property. A bill for the specific performance of that contract was dismissed,
on the theory that inasmuch as it was impossible to tell at this stage which chil-
dren would ultimately take-in other words, since the contingency was not yet
removed-those living had nothing to convey, and hence there could be no specific
performance. This case together with Compton v. Rixey's Executors,0 is open
to the objection that the most natural objects of a testator's bounty-his children
-take nothing. In the latter case there was a bill by the contingent remainder-
men to compel delivery of the estate to them upon the renunciation of the widow.
In sustaining the executor's demurrer to the bill, the court held that the contin-
gency was such 11 that in the nature of things the persons entitled to the property
can only be ascertained by the physical death of the widow
1 2
The next group of cases wherein contingent remainders are not accelerated
fall under what might conveniently be termed "the equitable theory". In these
cases courts find themselves on the horns of a most uncomfortable dilemma, in
that in addition to the bequest of a life estate there are several other sizable
specific bequests. When the life tenant renounces and takes against the will, the
specific bequests are cut into. If at such a time the contingent remainders are
accelerated, the specific legatees, who the testator unquestionably intended should
benefit, would have nothing to take. On the other hand, if the contingent re-
mainders are destroyed, particularly if children of the testator are involved, there
in an equal disregard of testamentary intent. It is obvious that a renunciation in
such a case causes manifold difficulties, and to accelerate the contingent remainder
would often work incalculable injustice.'3  Thus in Schaffenacker v. Beil,14 where
there was a contingent remainder 15 to the brothers and sisters of the testator, in
addition to other sizable specific bequests, the court refused to accelerate the re-
mainder on the ground that to do so, after the widow had taken against the will,
would leave the specific legatees entirely disappointed. There can be no doubt that
in such a case the result reached is more equitable than the case would be had the
contingent remainders been accelerated, even though such a result causes a delay
in winding up the estate.
The two cases of In re Lawrence's Estate "6 and Wilson, Executor, v. Hall, 7
may also be placed in this category. While it was not mentioned in these cases
10. 124 Va. 548, 98 S. E. 651 (I919).
ii. The remainder was to the children of the testator living at the death of the life
tenant.
12. See Small v. Marbury, 77 Md. II, 25 Atl. 920 (1893) ; Schultz's Estate, 113 Mich.
592, 71 N. W. 1079 (1897); Coover's Appeal, 74 Pa. 143 (1873) ; ,Woodburn's Estate, I5,
Pa. 587, 25 Atl. 145 (1892). For further cases under the "common law theory" see Swann
v. Austell, 261 Fed. 465 (i919), certiorari denied, 252 U. S. 579 (1920) ; Foreman Trust and
Savings Bank v. Seelenfreund, 329 Ill. 546, I6I N. E. 88 (1928) ; Miller v. Miller, 91 Kan.
I, 136 Pac. 953 (1913). In Key's Estate, 4 Pa. Dist. 134 (1895) it was held:
"While the result of the refusal of a widow . . . is to accelerate the gifts taking
effect at the expiration of the estate which it gives to her, it can only be so to the
extent that the legatees are in being, or can be ascertained, or have reached the age,
or fulfilled the conditions prescribed by the will as a requisite to their taking: and if a
hiatus is thus caused, the estate, in the meantime, will pass under the intestate laws
or to the residuary legatee, if there be one, as, for the time being, not specifically dis-
posed of."
It seems that the above quotation is, in effect, a holding that there can be no acceleration
of a contingent remainder.
13. See Developments in the Law--Future Interests-1932-934 (935) 48 IIARv. L.
REV. 1202, 1237-8.
14. 320 Ill. 31, i5o N. E. 333 (1926), io MixN. L. REv. 549.
15. The remainder was contingent upon the testator's ten brothers and sisters surviv-
ing his widow. The court specifically held this to be a contingent remainder.
16. 37 Misc. 702, 76 N. Y. Supp. 651 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
17. 6 Ohio C. C. 570 (1892).
NOTES
that at the time of the renunciation the ultimate takers could not be ascertained,
yet it dearly appears that the result reached was motivated for the most part by
the presence of specific legatees whose interests would otherwise have been sac-
rificed.18
The problem that ensues from an application of "the equitable doctrine" is
also a difficult one. Courts applying this theory, having thereby refused to accel-
erate the remainder, usually proceed further along equitable lines and take action
calculated to do justice to the specific legatees, the contingent remaindermen, and
at the same time uphold, as far as possible, the intention of the testator. This
task is accomplished to a large measure by resort to the equitable doctrine of
sequestration,19 by which the renounced life estate is set aside (sequestered) for
the benefit of the disappointed legatees.2 0  The renounced portion of the estate is
usually invested during the life of the renouncing life tenant, and consequently,
is increased in value because of the interest it draws. The sequestered estate
may, therefore, if the former life tenant lives long enough, increase sufficiently to
make up the deficiency caused by the taking against the will. Thus in Mer-
chant's National Bank of Maine v. Hubbard,2' the renounced life estate was
sequestered in order to satisfy the legatees disappointed by the renunciation.
The ultimate results of the sequestration do not appear, inasmuch as the propor-
tionate shares allotted to the beneficiaries under the will cannot be determined
until the former life tenant has died. It is possible, however, to reach an approx-
imation by determining the life expectancy of the renouncing party, and com-
pounding the interest received from the investment of the renounced estate for
that period.
22
There are two leading cases, which resolved the question of intention
against acceleration on what may be termed "the time theory". Courts adopting
this theory hold, in effect, that, regardless of rules of law, under the circumstances
it is evident that the testator could not have intended the remainderman to take
prior to a certain time. For example, in the case of Blatchford v. Newberry,
23
there was a devise to testator's wife for life, then to his daughters for life, but if
the daughters died before the wife, to the surviving descendants of the testator's
brothers and sisters. The daughters predeceased the wife who renounced the
life estate bequeathed to her. A bill for a division of the estate, brought by the
descendants of the testator's brothers and sisters living at the death of the last
surviving daughter, was dismissed, for the reason that the words "surviving
descendants" meant those surviving the widow who was not yet dead,24 and
therefore the time had not yet ripened for a distribution of the estate.
IS. For a further application of the "equitable theory", see Sawyer v. Freeman, 161
Mass. 543, 37 N. E. 942 (1894).
19. For a discussion of this doctrine as applied to vested remainders see Trustees of
Kenyon College v. Cleveland Trust Co., 130 Ohio St. 107, 196 N. E. 784 (935), 84 U. OF
PA. L. txv. II5.
2o. See I POMEaOY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3rd ed. 1905) § 517.
21. 222 Ala. 518, 133 So. 723 (1931).
22. See particularly (1935) 84 U. oF PA. L. REV. 115, 116 n. 5. For further cases deal-
ing with sequestration which is a problem separate and distinct from the one under dis-
cussion, see Selick v. Selick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N. W. 6og (i919) ; Holdren v. Holdren,
78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N. E. 845 (19o8) ; Page v. Rouss, 86 W. Va. 305, 1o3 S. E. 289 (1920).
See also Simes, The Acceleration of Future Interests, mtpra note I, at page 679 et seq.
23. 99 Ill. I1 (1878).
24. There was a vigorous dissent on the theory that the time of distribution was not
necessarily the date of the widow's death, but that this event was merely a boundary to
the termination of the preceding-estate and not a qualification for the taking of the ulterior
estate, and therefore, when the last daughter died the estate was ready for distribution.
See infra, p.
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Somewhat the same theory is expounded in the case of Crossan v. Crossan,
25
in which a remainder to the testator's daughters followed a life estate to his
widow, provided that the daughters care for their mother during her life. The
widow renounced, but the remainder to the daughters was not accelerated on the
ground that the testator intended that his daughters take nothing unless they
cared for their mother until her death; i. e., the time for distribution had not as
yet arrived.
26
II. Study of Cases Where Contingent Remainders Were Accelerated
The majority, and perhaps all, of the cases under this category proceed on
what might be classified as the "family benefit theory". Usually in these cases the
contingent bequest is to close relatives of the testator. Acceleration is permitted
by construing the will that the testator intended to care first for his wife and then
for his children or other close relatives, and the renunciation by the life tenant-
usually the widow-is equivalent to her death.
Thus in Disston's Estate,27 where the remainder was to the testator's son if
he be living at the death of the life tenant, and where the life tenant took against
the will, the court held:
"*... testator is presumed to know also the general rule that the election
of a widow to take under the intestacy laws is equivalent to her death, and
that, unless his will plainly indicates a contrary intent, remainders are accel-
erated accordingly." 28
The rather obvious answer to such a theory is that if the testator had contem-
plated a renunciation, he would have made a provision in the will to meet this
contingency.
In Scotten v. Moore 29 there was a devise to testator's wife for life, and there-
after to the then living children of the devisor. The wife took dower and received
adverse judgment in an action of ejectment brought by the children, on the
ground that no assignment of dower had as yet been made and therefore the widow
did not have as strong a right to possession as did the children. 0 Therefore, the
court allowed an acceleration although it did not appear that the primary object
of the testator's bounty-his widow-was as yet definitively cared for.2 1
A stronger case for the application of the "family benefit theory" is that of
Dean v. Hart,32 in which the testator devised Blackacre to his wife and his daugh-
25. 303 Mo. 572, 262 S. W. 7O (1924).
26. Two other cases failed to accelerate a contingent remainder, but for somewhat dif-
ferent reasons. In Cummings v. Hamilton, 220 Ill. 480, 77 N. E. 264 (i9o6), it was held
that a conveyance of part of the life estate to the contingent remainderman was not such
a destruction of the life estate so as to accelerate the remainder. Similarly in Keeton v.
Tipton, 184 Ky. 704, 212 S. W. 909 (1919), it was held that since the life tenant had taken
part of the profits of the life estate, there was not sufficient renunciation to bring about an
acceleration.
27. 257 Pa. 537, IOI Atl. 804 (1917).
28. Id. at 543, IOI Atl. 8o. See also In re Crothers' Estate (1915) 1 Ir. R. (Chanc.
Div.) 53.
29. 28 Del. 545, 93 Atl. 373 (1914).
3o. By way of dictum the court stated: "If the principle [of acceleration] is based on
the presumed intention of the testator, there need be no distinction between vested and con-
tingent remainders." This of course does not follow, since different rules of law apply
to vested and contingent remainders and a certain construction of intention may contravene
the law with regard to contingent remainders and may not, with regard to vested remain-
ders.
31. Whether a subsequent assignment of dower in a portion of the property would sup-
port an action of ejectment brought after that assignment by the widow against the chil-
dren was not considered.
32. 62 Ala. 308 (1878).
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ter for life, and then to the legal heirs of the daughter. The wife took dower and
her next of kin (who was not the daughter) petitioned that the residue of the
property pass as if there were an intestacy. It was held that the widow's renun-
ciation was equivalent to her death, that the daughter was entitled to a sole life
estate, and that on her death, her legal heirs would take by purchase. The sig-
nificance of the case so far as the instant problem is concerned lies in the fact that
no other legatees seem to have been involved. That being so, no grave injustice
is being done as the objects of the testator's bounty are being provided for, albeit
in a somewhat different fashion than intended.
Perhaps the only really justifiable case in the entire group is that of Christian
v. Wilson's Executors, 33 wherein the remainder was contingent upon the failure
of the widow to exercise a power of appointment. The widow renounced and the
court held that the remainderman was entitled to take, on the ground that the
power of appointment perished with the renunciation. It is significant that the
testator expressly provided that in the event the power of appointment was not
exercised, the estate should be administered solely for the benefit of the remain-
derman. This seems a clear indication of intent that the estate in the remainder-
man be postponed solely for the benefit of the widow.34
The inherent weakness of the "family benefit theory" is evident in the case of
Cockey v. Cockey,35 in which there was a devise to testator's wife for life with a
remainder to his son if he be then living. The court held that the renunciation of
the widow was equivalent to her death, and the remainder to the son became
vested upon that renunciation. Any loss resulting to other legatees was lightly
set aside as being a loss occasioned "by operation of law". It would seem that
this result transcends the bounds of reasonableness in what should be a fair con-
struction of intent.
36
In the case of Slocum v. Hagaman 37 there was a contingent remainder to
the testator's nieces and nephews living at the death of the life tenant. The same
jurisdiction which decided Blatchford v. Newberry twenty years earlier, held in
this case that the testator's intent was consistent with treating the renunciation
as equivalent to death.
38
There is a small group of cases in which the dominating factor might have
been akin to "the family benefit" theory, but in which the germ of a somewhat
different idea appears. Thus in three cases 39 where the remainder was contin-
gent upon certain members of the family living at the death of the life tenant, it
was held that the death of the life tenant was not a qualification of the taking of
the ulterior estate, but merely a limitation on the boundary of the previous estate,
and any event terminating the previous estate is sufficient to bring about accelera-
tion. This might be termed "the boundary theory". It really amounts to an
assumption of the conclusion to be reached; for, if the testator inserted the words
"at the death of the life tenant", it is difficult to perceive how any other event,
probably never contemplated by him, could be within the sphere of his intent.
33. 153 Va. 614, 151 S. E. 300 (1930).
34. The same court some nine years previous to the instant case in American Nat. Bank
v. Chapin, 130 Va. I, 107 S. E. 636 (3921), had held that the fact that the testator knew"
there was a possibility of renunciation and made no provisions therefor, indicated an inten-
tion that the remaindermen (his children) should take.
35. 141 Md. 373, 118 Atl. 850 (922).
36. See Rench v. Rench, 184 Ia. 1372, 169 N. W. 667 (1i8).
37. 176 Ill. 533, 52 N. E. 332 (1898).
38. The court was probably motivated by the fact that the life tenant who had re-
nounced died shortly after suit was brought. For further cases on the "family benefit
theory", see O'Rear v. Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S. W. 1107 (1914); Randall v. Randall, 85
Md. 43o, 37 Atl. 2o9 (1897).
39. Sherman v. Flack, 283 II. 457, 119 N. E. 293 (1918); Fox v. Rumery, 68 Me. 121
(1878) ; Macknet's Executor v. Macknet, 24 N. J. Eq. 277 (1873).
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Conclusion
In those jurisdictions where the common law 40 is still in force, there would,
seem to be no legal justification for the acceleration of contingent remainders,
for, under the common law reasoning, the ulterior interest must be construed as
a remainder because it is capable of taking effect as such. That being so, and the
particular estate being destroyed prior to the removal of the contingencies, the
conclusion is irresistible that the remainder is destroyed. In many jurisdictions,
however, the necessity of a particular estate to support a remainder has been
abrogated by statute.41  This has been the situation in England for over fifty
years.42 In these jurisdictions, strangely enough, the problem becomes even more
difficult. One obstacle to acceleration still remains, namely, that the contingen-
cies have not been removed. In these situations the field is a most fertile one for
a functionalistic approach. Utmost care must be invoked to protect the interests
of all who may be involved. A simplifying factor in aid of acceleration would
seem to be a total absence of any other specific devises. In such cases, however,
it is less likely that the life tenant would take against the will. Thus it would
seem that even in jurisdictions where the common law has been abrogated by
statute, the "equitable theory" is, in the majority of cases, when followed by the
application of the doctrine of sequestration, the proper approach to the problem.
It is only in the very simple case-where, for example, the life tenant is prevented
by law from taking, where statutes have replaced the common law with regard
to the necessity of a prior estate of freehold to support a remainder, where there
are no other specific bequests, and finally, where it appears clear that the intention
of the testator is that the interest of the remainderman be postponed solely for the
benefit of the life tenant-that the contingent interest should be accelerated. Of,
course, the only satisfactory curative lies in an express provision in the will to
meet the possibility of a renunciation, but in the absence of such a provision, the
individual factors of each particular case should be studied, and the varying possi-
bilities carefully considered before any acceleration is allowed.
D.M.P.
40. See supra note 4.
41. For typical statutes, see CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§741, 742; ILL. STAT.
ANN. (Cahill, 1931) c. 148, §24; OHio ANN. CODE (Page, 1931) §§ 10512-6; MAss. GEl.
LAws, 1921, c. 184, § 3; N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW §§ 57, 58. For further statutes in re de-
structibility, see Note (1926) II CORN. L. Q. 408. For Pennsylvania law, see Brown,
Problems of Construction Arising in the Law of Property-Particularly in the Law of Fu-
ture Interests (193) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 385, 414-22.
42. 8 & 9 Vict. c. io6 § 8 (1845) ; 40 & 41 Vict. c. 33 (1877).
